v / thirdparty / mbedtls / library / psa_crypto_ffdh.c
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1/*
2 * PSA FFDH layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto
3 */
4/*
5 * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
6 * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
7 */
8
9#include "common.h"
10
11#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
12
13/* This header is only needed because it defines
14 * MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHEXXXX_[P|G]_BIN symbols that are used in
15 * mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(). Apart from that, this module
16 * only uses bignum functions for arithmetic. */
17#include <mbedtls/dhm.h>
18
19#include <psa/crypto.h>
20#include "psa_crypto_core.h"
21#include "psa_crypto_ffdh.h"
22#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h"
23#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
24#include "mbedtls/error.h"
25
26#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \
27 defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \
28 defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) || \
29 defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH)
30static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(size_t key_size,
31 mbedtls_mpi *P,
32 mbedtls_mpi *G)
33{
34 const unsigned char *dhm_P = NULL;
35 const unsigned char *dhm_G = NULL;
36 size_t dhm_size_P = 0;
37 size_t dhm_size_G = 0;
38 int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
39
40 if (P == NULL && G == NULL) {
41 return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
42 }
43
44#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048)
45 static const unsigned char dhm_P_2048[] =
46 MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE2048_P_BIN;
47 static const unsigned char dhm_G_2048[] =
48 MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE2048_G_BIN;
49#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 */
50#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072)
51 static const unsigned char dhm_P_3072[] =
52 MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_P_BIN;
53 static const unsigned char dhm_G_3072[] =
54 MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_G_BIN;
55#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 */
56#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096)
57 static const unsigned char dhm_P_4096[] =
58 MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_P_BIN;
59 static const unsigned char dhm_G_4096[] =
60 MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_G_BIN;
61#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 */
62#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144)
63 static const unsigned char dhm_P_6144[] =
64 MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_P_BIN;
65 static const unsigned char dhm_G_6144[] =
66 MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_G_BIN;
67#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 */
68#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192)
69 static const unsigned char dhm_P_8192[] =
70 MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_P_BIN;
71 static const unsigned char dhm_G_8192[] =
72 MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_G_BIN;
73#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 */
74
75 switch (key_size) {
76#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048)
77 case sizeof(dhm_P_2048):
78 dhm_P = dhm_P_2048;
79 dhm_G = dhm_G_2048;
80 dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_2048);
81 dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_2048);
82 break;
83#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 */
84#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072)
85 case sizeof(dhm_P_3072):
86 dhm_P = dhm_P_3072;
87 dhm_G = dhm_G_3072;
88 dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_3072);
89 dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_3072);
90 break;
91#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 */
92#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096)
93 case sizeof(dhm_P_4096):
94 dhm_P = dhm_P_4096;
95 dhm_G = dhm_G_4096;
96 dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_4096);
97 dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_4096);
98 break;
99#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 */
100#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144)
101 case sizeof(dhm_P_6144):
102 dhm_P = dhm_P_6144;
103 dhm_G = dhm_G_6144;
104 dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_6144);
105 dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_6144);
106 break;
107#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 */
108#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192)
109 case sizeof(dhm_P_8192):
110 dhm_P = dhm_P_8192;
111 dhm_G = dhm_G_8192;
112 dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_8192);
113 dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_8192);
114 break;
115#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 */
116 default:
117 return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
118 }
119
120 if (P != NULL) {
121 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(P, dhm_P,
122 dhm_size_P));
123 }
124 if (G != NULL) {
125 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(G, dhm_G,
126 dhm_size_G));
127 }
128
129cleanup:
130 if (ret != 0) {
131 return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret);
132 }
133
134 return PSA_SUCCESS;
135}
136#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT ||
137 MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE ||
138 MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY ||
139 MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH */
140
141#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \
142 defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY)
143psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_export_public_key(
144 const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
145 const uint8_t *key_buffer,
146 size_t key_buffer_size,
147 uint8_t *data,
148 size_t data_size,
149 size_t *data_length)
150{
151 int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
152 psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
153 mbedtls_mpi GX, G, X, P;
154 psa_key_type_t type = attributes->type;
155
156 if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type)) {
157 if (key_buffer_size > data_size) {
158 return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
159 }
160 memcpy(data, key_buffer, key_buffer_size);
161 memset(data + key_buffer_size, 0,
162 data_size - key_buffer_size);
163 *data_length = key_buffer_size;
164 return PSA_SUCCESS;
165 }
166
167 mbedtls_mpi_init(&GX); mbedtls_mpi_init(&G);
168 mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); mbedtls_mpi_init(&P);
169
170 size_t key_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(attributes->bits);
171 if (key_len > data_size) {
172 status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
173 goto cleanup;
174 }
175
176 status = mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(key_len, &P, &G);
177
178 if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
179 goto cleanup;
180 }
181
182 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&X, key_buffer,
183 key_buffer_size));
184
185 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&GX, &G, &X, &P, NULL));
186 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&GX, data, key_len));
187
188 *data_length = key_len;
189
190 ret = 0;
191cleanup:
192 mbedtls_mpi_free(&P); mbedtls_mpi_free(&G);
193 mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); mbedtls_mpi_free(&GX);
194
195 if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && ret != 0) {
196 status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret);
197 }
198
199 return status;
200}
201#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT ||
202 MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY */
203
204#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)
205psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_generate_key(
206 const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
207 uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length)
208{
209 mbedtls_mpi X, P;
210 int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
211 psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
212 mbedtls_mpi_init(&P); mbedtls_mpi_init(&X);
213 (void) attributes;
214
215 status = mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(key_buffer_size, &P, NULL);
216
217 if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
218 goto cleanup;
219 }
220
221 /* RFC7919: Traditional finite field Diffie-Hellman has each peer choose their
222 secret exponent from the range [2, P-2].
223 Select random value in range [3, P-1] and decrease it by 1. */
224 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_random(&X, 3, &P, mbedtls_psa_get_random,
225 MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE));
226 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&X, &X, 1));
227 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&X, key_buffer, key_buffer_size));
228 *key_buffer_length = key_buffer_size;
229
230cleanup:
231 mbedtls_mpi_free(&P); mbedtls_mpi_free(&X);
232 if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && ret != 0) {
233 return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret);
234 }
235
236 return status;
237}
238#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */
239
240#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)
241psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_import_key(
242 const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
243 const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length,
244 uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,
245 size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits)
246{
247 (void) attributes;
248
249 if (key_buffer_size < data_length) {
250 return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
251 }
252 memcpy(key_buffer, data, data_length);
253 *key_buffer_length = data_length;
254 *bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(data_length);
255
256 return PSA_SUCCESS;
257}
258#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */
259
260#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH)
261psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_key_agreement(
262 const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
263 const uint8_t *peer_key,
264 size_t peer_key_length,
265 const uint8_t *key_buffer,
266 size_t key_buffer_size,
267 uint8_t *shared_secret,
268 size_t shared_secret_size,
269 size_t *shared_secret_length)
270{
271 int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
272 psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
273 mbedtls_mpi P, X, GY, K;
274 const size_t calculated_shared_secret_size = key_buffer_size;
275
276 if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(psa_get_key_type(attributes))) {
277 return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
278 }
279
280 if (peer_key_length != key_buffer_size) {
281 return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
282 }
283
284 /* This has been checked by the core, but keep a local check too. */
285 if (calculated_shared_secret_size > shared_secret_size) {
286 return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
287 }
288
289 mbedtls_mpi_init(&P);
290 mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); mbedtls_mpi_init(&GY);
291 mbedtls_mpi_init(&K);
292
293 status = mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(
294 PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(attributes->bits), &P, NULL);
295
296 if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
297 goto cleanup;
298 }
299
300 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&GY, peer_key,
301 peer_key_length));
302
303 /* RFC 7919 5.1: validate the peer's public key: 1 < GY < P-1
304 *
305 * This check is sufficient to ensure GY is not of low order, because we're
306 * using a safe prime (that is, q = (p-1) / 2 is also prime), so the only
307 * group elements of low order are 1 and p-1. (Obviously we also want to
308 * exclude 0 that is not a group element, and values >= p as they are not
309 * residues mod p.)
310 *
311 * Note: we know we're using a safe prime because the only FFDH groups
312 * defined by the PSA spec are from RFC 7919 (since version 1.0) and RFC
313 * 3525 (since v1.4, not yet supported in tf-psa-crypto as of writing this
314 * comment), which both use safe primes.
315 *
316 * Note: NIST SP 800-56Ar3 5.7.1.1 (2) has the check on the shared secret,
317 * but checking before is equivalent (unless our secret key is exactly
318 * (p-1)/2, which has negligible probability and can't be influenced by the
319 * adversary). Checking before is cleaner in terms of side channel analysis,
320 * as we haven't loaded our secret yet, so no worries about branches.
321 *
322 * Use X as a temporary, since we haven't loaded it yet.
323 */
324 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&X, &P, 1)); // x = p - 1
325 if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&GY, &X) >= 0) {
326 status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
327 goto cleanup;
328 }
329 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&X, 1)); // x = 1
330 if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&GY, &X) <= 0) {
331 status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
332 goto cleanup;
333 }
334
335 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&X, key_buffer,
336 key_buffer_size));
337
338 /* Calculate shared secret public key: K = G^(XY) mod P = GY^X mod P */
339 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&K, &GY, &X, &P, NULL));
340
341 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&K, shared_secret,
342 calculated_shared_secret_size));
343
344 *shared_secret_length = calculated_shared_secret_size;
345
346 ret = 0;
347
348cleanup:
349 mbedtls_mpi_free(&P);
350 mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); mbedtls_mpi_free(&GY);
351 mbedtls_mpi_free(&K);
352
353 if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && ret != 0) {
354 status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret);
355 }
356
357 return status;
358}
359#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH */
360
361#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
362